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Abstract
Separate lines of research have noted recruitment of parietal cortex during tasks involving visuo-spatial processes and
empathy. To explore the relationship between these two functions, a self-other perspective transformation task and a task
of spatial attention (line bisection) were administered to 40 healthy participants (19 women). Performance on these tasks
was examined in relation to self-reported empathy. Rightward biases in line bisection correlated positively with trait-level
self-reported empathic concern, suggesting a left hemisphere mediation of this prosocial personality trait. Unexpectedly,
speed of perspective taking in the self-other transformation task correlated negatively with empathic concern, but only in
women, which we interpret in light of gender differences in empathy and strategies for egocentric mental transformations.
Together, the findings partially support the commonalities in visuo-spatial attention, perspective-taking and empathy. More
broadly, they shed additional light on the relationship between basic cognitive functions and complex social constructs.
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Introduction
‘‘…we observe a man’s actions and place ourselves partly
but not wholly in his position; or we act, and place ourselves
partly in the position of an outsider.’’
T.S. Eliot [1]
Spatial metaphors are often used to describe empathy (i.e.,
putting oneself in another’s shoes), but little work has been done to
examine the empirical relationship between empathy and visuo-
spatial abilities. Interestingly, there seems to be shared brain
regions associated with these two functions; parietal regions have
long been implicated in visuo-spatial processing [for review see 2],
and recent neuroimaging work investigating neural correlates of
empathic responding have also noted recruitment of parietal
networks [3,4]. The major aim of the present study was to
investigate the relationship between self-reported trait empathy
and indices of visuo-spatial ability that have been associated with
parietal cortical functioning, specifically imagined self-other
transformations and biases in spatial attention. A secondary aim
was to examine this putative relationship as a function of gender,
as sex differences have been reported for both empathy [5] and
visuo-spatial processing [6].
One problem that impedes the scientific study of empathy is the
apparent difficulty in reaching a consensus on the definition. In the
most general sense, empathy refers to processes of interpreting and
reacting to the experiences of others, and many researchers agree
that empathy is a multifaceted construct that involves both
cognitive and emotional components [see 7]. Cognitive empathy
refers to a controlled process by which an individual projects
himself or herself into the place of another. It is closely akin to the
construct of ‘theory of mind’, attribution of mental states to oneself
and others. On the other hand, emotional empathy commonly
refers to the more automatic affective response to the experience of
others, which can motivate concern and subsequent helping
behavior. It is argued that a sense of shared interpersonal space, or
self-other equivalence, is a basic prerequisite for empathy [8]. An
interesting question stems from this idea: to what extent is this
shared interpersonal space visuo-spatially represented? How is
perspective-taking, in the abstract sense, related to visuo-spatial
perspective-taking and imagined self-other transformations?
Amorim [9] provides a conceptual link between social perception
and understanding what another individual sees. He notes that
using visual cues such as eye gaze to discern where another
individual is directing attention requires the coordination of one’s
own perspective and the perspective of a second party.
Egocentric mental rotation refers to imagined changes in
position and orientation relative to the surrounding environment.
On the other hand, object-centered mental rotation involves
mentally manipulating an object relative to its own reference
frame. A specific subset of egocentric mental rotation tasks, in
which subjects are required to mentally transform themselves into
the body of another, can be used to investigate visuo-spatial self-
other transformations. These tasks typically require individuals to
imagine taking the position of a figure on a screen and make
judgments about the location of body parts [see 10]. It has been
consistently reported that response times (RTs) are longer when
the position of the figure does not match the position of the
subject, because he/she has to make an additional perspective
transformation [e.g. 10,11]. This finding is consistent with
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rotation correspond to RTs for physical rotation and increase as
the required degree of mental rotation increases [12].
Evidence from the neuropsychological and neuroimaging
literature suggests that the specific brain structures involved in
egocentric mental rotation are partially distinct from those
involved with object-centered rotation. Results differ somewhat
across neuroimaging studies, likely because of the particular task
demands. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
parietal cortex [13–15], medial prefrontal cortex [e.g. 13],
premotor cortex [15], supplementary motor areas [14], and
inferior frontal cortex [14,15] have been found to be more active
when individuals are asked to make judgments about an external
scene from the viewpoint of an allocentric, or second-person,
perspective versus a first-person perspective. Imagined rotation of
a body part, usually a hand, recruits a similar network of parietal
and premotor regions [e.g. 16]. Neural correlates of whole-body
self-other transformations include the left frontal cortex [e.g. 11]
and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) [11,17]. Evidence
supporting lateralized activity of the TPJ during own-body mental
transformations is mixed, with some evidence supporting left
hemisphere [11], and others supporting a stronger role of the right
hemisphere [17]. Moreover, lesions of the TPJ have been
associated with out-of-body experiences, the phenomenon of
observing one’s body from an apparently external viewpoint [18].
Interestingly, recent studies investigating the neural underpin-
nings of empathy and shared metaphoric interpersonal space have
also highlighted the role of the right TPJ, especially with regards to
distinguishing one’s own perspective from others’. Increased right
TPJ activity has been associated with adopting the perspective of
another individual [e.g. 19], and has been suggested to play a
major role in a sense of agency [20].
Social and emotional processes are typically thought to be
mediated predominantly by the right hemisphere [see 21],
however a simple right-left hemispheric distinction is an
oversimplification. For example, in a sample of unilateral frontal
and posterior lesion patients, both right and left frontal lesions
were found to impair empathic abilities equally; but in the
posterior lesion group, only those with right lesions were impaired
[22]. Buck [23] hypothesizes that emotions have both individu-
alistic and prosocial functions. Some emotions function for self
preservation and others function toward preservation of the
species, and he posits that they are associated with right and left
hemispheres, respectively. This theory has received some empirical
support. During the Wada procedure, in which one hemisphere is
inactivated, changes in behavior following inactivation of the right
hemisphere were consistent with a change from ‘‘selfish’’ to social
emotions [24]. Moreover, MacLean [25] suggests that cingulate
areas are associated with prosocial emotions and temporal limbic
systems are associated with individualistic emotion, and in a
resting state metabolism study, Gur et al., [26] found greater left
lateralized metabolism in cingulate gyrus and greater right
lateralized metabolism in the temporal limbic system. To date,
the unique roles of left and right hemispheric contributions to
empathy are thus unclear, especially compared to the far more
unequivocal picture with respect to the lateralization of spatial
attention.
Asymmetries in hemispheric activation can be indexed by
measuring the spatial distribution of attention, according to the
activation-orienting hypothesis, [27], which suggests that there is a
bias to orient attention in the direction contralateral to the more
activated hemisphere. This lateralized bias in attentional orienting
holds whether the contralateral hemisphere is stimulated or the
ipsilateral hemisphere is inhibited. Biases in the orienting of spatial
attention may be assessed reliably using the line bisection task,
which is commonly administered to unilateral neglect patients and
healthy controls. Consistent with the activation-orienting hypoth-
esis, individuals with lesions of the right inferior parietal or TPJ
exhibit pronounced spatial neglect of the left hemifield [e.g. 28],
and consequently bisect horizontal lines markedly to the right of
center [29]. Similarly, healthy individuals tend to show a subtle
deviation to the left in line bisection, referred to as ‘‘pseudone-
glect’’ [for review see 30]. Most proposed mechanisms for this
deviation relate to right hemisphere dominance in the control of
spatial attention [31]. Although the relative hemispheric domi-
nance indexed by the line bisection task has not been related to
measures of empathy, lateral deviations have been found to be
correlated with other personality measures associated with
hemispheric lateralization such as trait affect [32] and magical
ideation [33].
The aim of the current study was to examine the relationship
between self-report measures of trait-level empathy and visuo-
spatial processing, namely imagining self-other perspective trans-
formations and biases in spatial attention, in healthy individuals.
We predicted that: 1) efficiency of an imagined visuo-spatial self-
other transformation would be associated with increased self-
reported empathy, given its face validity and evidence for common
brain regions involved in both functions; 2) higher self-report
empathy scores would be associated with right hemispheric
activity, and thus increased pseudoneglect (leftward bias) given
the literature on right hemispheric involvement in emotional
processes. We also explored whether the relationship between
visuo-spatial processing and empathy would differ across genders,
given reported gender differences in both visuo-spatial skills [6]
and empathy [e.g. 5].
Methods
Participants
40 healthy subjects (19 females) were recruited by community
fliers and an e-mail advertisement at the University of Zurich and
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Eidgeno ¨ssische
Technische Hochschule Zu ¨rich). Participants were screened for
a history of mental illness in themselves or family members, drug
use, head injury, and left-handedness according to a 13-item
handedness questionnaire [34]. Subjects had a mean age of 26.1
(s.d.=6.7 years) and 16.3 (s.d.=2.8) years of education. Age and
education did not differ significantly between males and females
(age: t(38)=1.55, p=.13; education: t(38)=0.93, p=.36). The
study protocol was approved by the Vanderbilt University
Institutional Review Board and was in specific agreement with
ethical and safety guidelines from the University Hospital of
Zu ¨rich. Written informed consent was obtained from all subjects
prior to testing, and experiments were conducted according to the
Declaration of Helsinki. Subjects were compensated for their
participation.
Self-reported empathy questionnaire
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index [IRI; 35] is a 28-item
empathy measure consisting of four subscales: Perspective-Taking
(PT), Fantasy (FS), Empathic Concern (EC), and Personal Distress
(PD), and assessed using a 5-point Likert scale (0–4). We used the
German translation of the IRI by Paulus [36], without the items
comprising Competence as a 5
th subscale. The IRI was developed
using a multidimensional approach and was designed to evaluate
both the cognitive and affective components of empathy. The PT
subscale assesses the tendency to adopt the psychological
viewpoint of others, and the FS subscale assesses the tendency to
Empathy and Spatial Processes
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two scales were designed to measure the cognitive component of
empathy. The EC scale assesses ‘‘other-oriented’’ feelings of
sympathy and concern, and the PD scale measures feelings of
interpersonal anxiety in response to other people’s distress. Since
scores on the FS and PD scales have been associated with social
dysfunction, and the PD scale was found to be negatively
correlated with other empathy measures [37], we focused on the
more psychometrically validated PT and EC scores to index
cognitive and emotional components of empathy, respectively.
Spatial tasks
Line Bisection. Nine 16 cm horizontal lines were each
presented on a single sheet of paper. Each line was centered
vertically on the sheet in one of three possible horizontal locations
(left aligned, right aligned, or centered). Each sheet was placed
centrally in front of the subject, who was instructed to make a
small mark through the center of the line. Each line was measured
to find the deviation of the mark from true center, and the mean
deviation was calculated. The proportional frequency of lateral
errors, or Index, was calculated by subtracting the number of
leftward errors from the number of rightward errors and dividing
this difference by the total number of errors. For both of these
measures, negative scores represent leftward errors.
Perspective-taking Task. We used stimuli similar to those
used in previous studies of perspective-taking and mental self-other
transformations A photograph ofa manwith hisarms out to the side
faced either toward or away from the participant and was rotated
around the center by 0u,6 0 u, 120u, or 180u. Different angles of
presentation is common practice in studies of imagined self-other
transformations and mental rotation of objects [10,12,38], and were
used in order to discourage participants from memorizing
associations between particular stimuli and motor responses [see
11]. The stimulus figure was presented against a background of a
schematic door or bed, or against a blank background as part of an
exploratory analysis of whether there were differences in the
efficiency of performing a self-other transformation on a figure in a
supine versus upright condition. Either the right or left hand was
markedbyaredcircle (Figure 1).Participants were asked toimagine
themselves in the position of the figure on the screen and indicate
whether the circled hand would be their right or left hand by
pressing a key corresponding to left and right, as quickly and
accurately as possible. A left judgment was indicated by the left key
press and right judgment was indicated by the right key press, using
their middle and index fingers. Stimulus presentation and response
collection was controlled by Matlab [39].
Stimuli extended 17u degrees of visual angle horizontally and
vertically and were presented in the center of the computer screen
until a response was made or after a 10 s time-out period. A black
fixation cross was presented during the 1000 ms intertrial interval
before the next trial could begin. Response hand was counterbal-
anced across subjects and approximately balanced within genders
(males: 11 left hand responders; females: 9 left hand responders).
The mapping of finger onto left or right hand response was
dependent on response hand. When using the left hand, left and
right hand responses mapped onto the middle and index finger,
respectively; mappings of finger onto response was reversed when
using the right hand to respond. Such finger-mapping is
commonplace in work on spatial stimulus-response compatibilities
[40–42]. The experiment consisted of 384 total trials, divided into
four blocks, which consisted of 8 presentations of each stimulus
type in a randomized order. Trials in which the subject did not
respond within the 10 s time-out period were excluded from
further analysis.
Figure 1. Example stimuli in the Perspective-taking Task. Panel A. Back-facing condition; no perspective transformation is required. Panel B.
Front-facing condition; requires imagined self-other transformation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005864.g001
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dependent variables of interest. The Perspective-taking RT was
defined as the relative increase in RT for making a hand judgment
for front versus back facing figures using the formula [(mean Front
RT-mean Back RT)/mean Back RT], using only correct trials.
Increased Perspective-taking RT indicated a relative increase in
time needed to perform an imagined perspective change.
Following the experiment, subjects were asked to report the
strategy they used to perform the task, and written reports were
categorized by whether the participant used a body-centered
strategy or not. Written strategies that were too ambiguous to rate
were excluded from analysis. They were also asked to rate how
strongly they imagined themselves in the perspective of the figure
on the computer screen on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very
strongly).
Testing procedure
The above tasks were conducted as part of a larger battery of
visuo-spatial and personality measures. The task order was
counterbalanced across subjects.
Data analysis
Separate repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on
mean RT and error rate in the Perspective-taking task, with
gender entered as a between-subject variable and background,
perspective, and angle of rotation entered as within-subject
variables. Shapiro-Wilk statistics indicated that Perspective-taking
RT, line bisection mean deviation and index scores, and IRT PT
subscale scores were distributed normally (all p-values..10).
However, scores on the IRI EC subscale were not normally
distributed (W=0.94, p=.02). For all normally distributed
variables, pairwise gender comparisons were assessed using
independent two-sample t-tests. Independent one-sample t-tests
were used to compare the frequency of lateral errors and
Perspective-taking RT to a hypothesized mean of 0. Pearson
correlation coefficients were calculated to evaluate the relationship
between continuous variables, both within and across genders. For
the IRI EC subscale, gender comparisons were assessed with the
Wilcoxon test, and Spearman rank-correlation coefficients were
used to evaluate the relationship between scores on this subscale
and other continuous measures. Pearson Chi-squared tests were
used to examine the significance of gender on differences in self-
reported strategies. All tests were two-tailed, except where
otherwise noted, and the alpha level was set at 0.05. Univariate
outliers were identified as those individuals who scored outside
three s.d.’s from the within-gender mean and were excluded from
further analyses involving those measures.
Results
Self-reported empathy scale
Means for the IRI PT and EC subscales are displayed in
Table 1. One-tailed tests were used to compare scores across males
and females, as previous research has found females score higher
on all of the IRI subscales [35]. No gender difference was observed
on the PT subscale (t(38)=.07, p=.47), but the mean IRI EC
subscale score was higher for females (Z=1.69, p=.05).
Spatial tasks
Line Bisection. The mean deviation and index score are
displayed in Table 1. No gender differences were observed using
either measure (mean deviation: t(38)=0.62, p=.54; index score:
t(38)=0.66, p=.51). Since we had an a priori hypothesis of a
significant leftward bias on the line bisection task based on
extensive previous literature, a one-tailed one-sample independent
t-test was conducted to compare the mean deviation and index
score to 0. As there was no gender difference, we only examined
pseudoneglect collapsed across genders. There was a trend
towards a leftward bias using both the mean deviation
(t(39)=1.44, p=.08) and index scores (t(39)=1.41, p=.08).
Although this effect did not reach significance, the mean
leftward deviation (0.52 mm) is comparable to that found in
previous studies [e.g. 32].
Perspective-taking Task. We were primarily interested in
effects of gender and perspective of the stimulus figure (front-
versus back-facing).
Errors
There was a significant effect of perspective on error rate
(F(1,38)=20.4, p,.0001), although error rates for both conditions
were low (front-facing: 3.563.3%, back-facing: 1.661.9%). Full
ANOVA (Table S1) and means (Table S2) tables for error rate are
included as supporting information. Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients were calculated to investigate the relationship between RTs
and error rates in both the front- and back-facing conditions. In
the back-facing condition, there was no significant relationship
between RT and error rate (r=.25, p=.12). In the front-facing
condition mean RT and error rate were significantly positively
correlated (r=.44, p=.004); higher error rates were associated
with longer RTs. Error rates and RTs being higher in the more
difficult front-facing condition and RTs and error rates being
positively correlated in the front-facing condition support the
notion that results cannot be explained by a speed-accuracy
tradeoff.
RT
There was a robust effect of perspective on mean RT
(F(1,38)=128.5, p,.0001), with slower performance in the
front-facing (11836346 ms) versus back-facing condition
(9486253 ms). There were no main effects of gender, nor any
gender interaction effects. Full ANOVA (Table S1) and means
(Table S2) tables for RTs are included as supporting information.
Perspective-taking RT
One male participant was excluded from this analysis because of
Perspective-taking RT greater than three s.d.’s from the gender
Table 1. Mean scores for self-reported empathy and spatial
tasks, both collapsed and split by gender (mean6s.d.).
Males
(n=21)
Females
(n=19) All subjects
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Perspective-Taking 17.7163.02 17.7964.22 17.7563.59
Empathic Concern* 18.3364.13 20.8463.82 19.5364.13
Spatial Tasks
Line Bisection: Index
Score
20.1860.53 20.0660.56 20.1260.54
Line Bisection: Mean
Deviation
20.7462.22 20.2862.51 20.5262.34
Perspective-taking RT
a 0.2560.08 0.2160.09 0.2360.09
aOne male subject was removed because his RT was above three standard
deviations from the mean Perspective-taking RT.
*Gender difference, p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005864.t001
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Table 1. No gender differences were observed for Perspective-
taking RT (t(37)=1.38, p=.17), so we collapsed across gender to
compare Perspective-taking RT to zero. A score of zero would
indicate that no additional time was needed to make a handedness
judgment when an imagined change in perspective was required.
Perspective-taking RT was significantly greater than zero
(t(38)=16.98, p,.0001), and this pattern was observed for all
subjects. There were no differences in Perspective-taking RT
across response hands for either males (t(18)=.28, p=.78) or
females (t(17)=0.99, p=.34). Although there was no effect of
gender on Perspective-taking RT, females reported imagining
themselves in the perspective of the figure on the screen
significantly stronger than men (men: 3.6561.90, women:
4.6861.16; p=.05). Moreover, there was a trend for more males
than females to report use a non-egocentric strategy (26.3% vs.
5.9%; x
2 (1, N=35)=3.19, p=.07). Three males and two females
were removed from this analysis because of ambiguous reported
strategies.
Empathy-Visuo-spatial correlations
Correlations and p-values are displayed in Table 2.
Line bisection and empathy correlations. Since the line
bisection mean deviation and index score were tightly correlated
(r=.90, p,.0001), only the index score was used to examine the
association between self-reported empathy subscales and line
bisection. Collapsed across genders, scores on the EC subscale of
the IRI were positively correlated with line bisection index scores
(Figure 2; rs=.55, p=.0002), such that higher empathic concern
scores were associated with more frequent rightward line
bisections, and this correlation was significant in both males
(rs=.61, p=.003) and females (rs=.48, p=.04). However, scores
on the IRI PT subscale did not correlate with line bisection scores,
either across (r=0.10, p=.55) or within genders (males: r=.07,
p=.78; females: r=0.12, p=.62).
Perspective-taking RT and empathy correlations. Again,
one male was excluded from analysis for being an outlier on the
Perspective-taking RT. Collapsed across gender, there was no
significant correlation between the IRI EC subscale and
Perspective-taking RT (rs=0.22, p=.18). Examining the
correlations by gender revealed a significant correlation in
women (rs=0.70, p=.0008), but not men (rs=20.17, p=.47).
That is, in women only, longer RTs needed to perform a
perspective transformation were associated with increased self-
reported empathic concern (Figure 3).
This result was contrary to our initial hypothesis, but an
alternative and plausible account might be that in women, a
decrease in Perspective-taking RT reflects an overly blurred
distinction between self and other. That is, less time needed to
make an imagined self-other physical transformation could be
related to less distinct mental representations of self and other.
This blurred self-other distinction could be reflected in suscepti-
bility to emotion contagion, which refers to incorporating the
affective state of another person without being aware that it is not
your own feeling—essentially, not maintaining a self-other
distinction. The Personal Distress scale of the IRI is related to
measures of emotion contagion [43]. Post-hoc analyses revealed
that the PD scale was marginally associated with speed of a
perspective transformation in females (rs=20.39, p=.10), but not
males (rs=0.13, p=.58). Moreover, in females, but not males, the
IRI PD scale was negatively correlated with the IRI EC scale
(females: rs=20.58, p=.01; males: rs=20.35, p=.14). Thus, in
females, more interpersonal anxiety due to distress in another was
significantly associated with less empathic concern and marginally
related to faster Perspective-taking RT.
There was no significant correlation between the IRI PT
subscale and Perspective-taking RT either across (r=0.14, p=.38)
or within genders (males: r=20.04, p=.86; females: r=0.27,
p=.26).
Discussion
We examined the relationship between visuo-spatial processing,
specifically imagined self-other transformations and biases in
spatial attention, and self-reported empathy in healthy young
individuals. Specifically, we tested two hypotheses, which are
addressed here in turn.
First, we expected participants’ efficiency of self-other transfor-
mations (‘‘embodied perspective-taking’’) to be correlated with
increased self-reported empathy, given its face validity and
evidence for common brain regions involved in both functions.
Contrary to this expectation, we found that, in the women, speed
of visuo-spatial self-other transformations was associated with
decreased self-reported empathic concern. Although purely specu-
Table 2. Correlations between empathy and spatial tasks.
Males
(n=21)
Females
(n=19) All subjects
r p rp rp
Line Bisection Index Score
Perspective-Taking
a 0.07 .78 0.12 .62 0.09 .55
Empathic Concern 0.48* .04 0.61** .003 0.55** .0002
Perspective-taking RT
Perspective-Taking
a 20.04 .86 0.27 .26 0.14 .38
Empathic Concern
a 20.17 .47 0.70** .0008 0.22 .18
aOne male subject was removed because his RT was above three standard
deviations from the mean Perspective-taking RT.
*p,.05.
**p,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005864.t002
Figure 2. Relationship between empathic concern scores and
line bisection index scores. Negative index scores indicate a
leftward bias on the line bisection task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005864.g002
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finding is that self-other perspective changes reportedly increase
self-referential processing [44]. Ames, et al. [44] found that
adopting the cognitive perspective of another individual increased
activity in medial frontal regions associated with introspection. In
women, empathic concern was negatively associated with scores on
the Personal Distress scale of the IRI. Again, this scale is related to
measures of susceptibility to emotion contagion [43] and a
putative decrease in a self-other distinction [45]. This finding of an
association between higher empathic concern and lower personal
distress is consistent with prior work. Hoffman [46] proposed a
theory in which perspective-taking and sympathy are negatively
related to feelings of personal distress when observing another
individual in distress, whereby one cannot differentiate self from
other. Moreover, Davis [37] found that the IRI PD scale, which
measures anxiety in tense interpersonal settings, was negatively
correlated with other empathy measures. It is possible that more
efficient visuo-spatial self-other transformations were associated
with an increased tendency towards self-referential processing, and
thus a decrease in trait empathic concern, which is associated with
prosocial, other-oriented behaviors. This argument is bolstered by
our finding of a marginal, albeit nonsignificant, decrease in
Perspective-taking RT with increasing PD scores in women. That
is, in women, increased scores of personal distress when observing
another in distress tended to be associated with faster self-other
transformations.
Although, to our knowledge, there are no studies that directly
address the relationship between self-referential processing and
speed of visuo-spatial perspective-taking, there are some bodies of
research that speak indirectly to this idea. Research investigating
vantage point taken in episodic memories has shown that asking
people to focus on objective circumstances associated with a
particular event led them to recall the event from an observer’s
perspective, whereas asking individuals to focus on the feelings
associated with the event leads to recollection of the event from a
first-person perspective [47]. Likewise, being instructed to recall a
particular event from an observer’s perspective leads to recollec-
tion of more concrete information about the event, whereas
instructions to recall the event from a first-person perspective led
to more self-oriented descriptions of affective reactions and
physical sensations [48].
Moreover, work by Ku ¨hnen and Oyserman [49], found that
manipulation of self-focus improved speed and accuracy on tasks
that were congruent with the primed self focus. On the other hand,
one might also expect interpersonal anxiety to hinder the
efficiency of perspective transformations given the literature on
anxiety and cognitive performance [50]. To sum, it is possible that
increased RT on the visuo-spatial perspective-taking task may
reflect a stronger self-other distinction. However, future work with
a fuller range of Personal Distress scores is needed to elucidate the
nature of this relationship.
There are several possible reasons why this relationship between
efficiency of imagined self-other transformations and trait
empathic concern was observed in women, but not men. Firstly,
women reported higher empathic concern, consistent with many
previous studies of gender differences in empathy [5]. Moreover,
upon debriefing, women reported imagining themselves in the
perspective of the figure on the screen more strongly than men,
and there was a trend for a greater proportion of women to report
using a body-centered strategy. Self-report data indicates that they
might have been using more of an egocentric strategy on the task.
This interpretation is consistent with data indicating that men are
more likely to use an object-based strategy in a spatial perspective-
taking task, and women are likely to consistently employ an
egocentric strategy [14]. Schulte-Ru ¨ther et al. [51] suggest that,
based on recent neuroimaging work, males and females may use
different cognitive and emotional processes for empathic respond-
ing which may lead to gender differences in empathy.
It is unclear why Perspective-taking RT was not related to the
PT subscale of the IRI, which measures more cognitive aspects of
empathy. A recent fMRI study might speak to these findings.
Nummenmaa, et al. [52] found that emotional versus cognitive
empathy was associated with increases in neural networks
associated with body perception. Future neuroimaging work could
help clarify the unique relationship between cognitive versus
affective empathy and visuo-spatial perspective-taking.
Our second hypothesis was that increased self-report empathy
scores would be associated with a leftwardattentional bias, given the
Figure 3. Relationship between empathic concern scores and Perspective-taking RT, (mean Front RT-mean Back RT)/mean Back RT.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005864.g003
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altruistic behaviors. Our prediction was not confirmed. Most
strikingly, we found a robust relationship, in women and men,
between rightward deviations in line bisection and self-reported
empathic concern. This could indicate an association of increased
empathic concern with either increased left hemispheric activation
or decreased right hemispheric activation, or a hemispheric
activation imbalance. On second consideration, this finding is not
entirely inconsistent with the existing literature. Rightward bias on
the line bisection task was only associated with the empathic
concern subscale of the IRI, not the more cognitive perspective-
taking subscale. The empathic concern subscale was developed to
measure more prosocial aspects of empathy [37], and, as described
in the introduction, there is evidence for a leading role of the left
hemisphere in prosocial motivations [see 23].
It is interesting to note that left hemisphere activation has long
been associated with positive emotion and approach behavior,
whereas right hemisphere activation has been linked to negative
emotion and withdrawal behavior [53–55]. More specifically,
anxious arousal and threat-related information have been linked to
the right posterior activation [53,56]. The observed correlation
between empathic concern and rightward attentional bias may be
interpreted in this context; one might hypothesize that empathic
concern is not possible when one is feeling threatened. However,
data on hemispheric asymmetry of emotional functions must be
interpreted with caution as most studies measure relative activity of
the two hemispheres (e.g. left hemisphere.right hemisphere).
Another possible explanation is related to the laterality of
emotional facial expressions. It has been found that the left side of
the face is more emotionally expressive, possibly because of the
role of the right hemisphere in emotion perception and expression
[57]. The left side of the face would be in the right visual field of an
observer, and, possibly, a rightward bias in spatial attention may
enhance one’s ability to perceive emotions in other people.
Specifically, it is distressed emotional cues that reportedly elicit
empathic responding [see 7].
Although, to our knowledge, there has not been much evidence
for changes in emotional empathy in individuals with right parietal
damage resulting in unilateral neglect, the existing literature on
Williams Syndrome may shed some light on this issue. Williams
Syndrome is a developmental syndrome characterized by low
intellectual functioning, heightened sociability and empathy, a
relative strength in language, and profound visuo-spatial impair-
ments [58]. More in-depth studies of empathy in Williams
syndrome have suggested that only the affective, not cognitive
components, of empathy are spared or superior [59]. Interestingly,
the spatial impairments found in Williams syndrome have been
likened to those with right hemisphere damage [60]. Thus, work in
developmental psychopathology provides some evidence for a link
between emotional empathy and deficits in right hemisphere
mediated visuo-spatial functions.
In conclusion, we found that one facet of trait-level empathy,
empathic concern, was associated with performance in two visuo-
spatial tasks. First, efficiency in performing an imagined self-other
visuo-spatial transformation was associated, in women but not
men, with decreased self-reported empathic concern. Second,
increased rightward biases in line bisection were associated with
increased self-reported empathic concern, pointing to greater left
compared to right hemisphere mediation of this kind of empathy.
As we do not have substantial neuroimaging or lesion data that
speak to these results, we acknowledge that these links between
visuo-spatial perspective-taking, biases in spatial attention, and
empathy are somewhat tenuous, and our conclusions are only
speculative. These are complex issues, but with these data, we can
offer a hypothesis for future studies. Although further research is
neededto replicate and refine theseresults,theparadigms employed
hereprovide a unique approachto examiningrelationshipsbetween
basic cognitive functions and complex social constructs.
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